The economics of war: the West must embrace mass production of weapons

The development of mass-used strike systems has accelerated sharply over the past two to three years, above all since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. As early as 2022, Ukrainian military intelligence estimated that Moscow would be able to produce 6,000 Shahed-class unmanned aerial vehicles a year by 2025.

In practice, more than 54,000 drones classified as heavy struck Ukraine in 2025, although that tally also included Gerbera-class UAVs. Nobody is surprised any more by reports of 100, 200 or even 400 drones used in a single wave (and larger raids have occurred), and the number of „operational-tactical level” UAS destroyed daily by Ukrainian forces now exceeds 2,000.

The response to these threats must likewise be on a mass scale. Western states manufacture modern air-defence systems — from the US Patriot and the European SAMP/T, through short-range systems such as CAMM, IRIS-T or NASAMS (and missiles like the Sidewinder). Yet these specific systems have been designed to face an entirely different threat: manned aircraft and cruise missiles, and in the case of Patriot and SAMP/T, ballistic missiles as well. 

Missiles for these SAM systems are expensive (from a few thousand dollars for some short-range rounds to several million dollars apiece — the equivalent of roughly PLN 20m) and difficult to produce; lead times after ordering are measured in two to three years.

In practice, therefore, their production volumes are not sufficient even to intercept the most challenging targets (such as ballistic missiles for Patriot and SAMP/T), let alone cope with proliferated swarms. Given the mass employment of drones and Russia’s experience in using them, western states are simply not properly prepared to fend off attacks that rely on them.

Evidence of the problem is visible in the Persian Gulf. Although forces subordinate to United States Central Command and several Gulf states, which already have some experience and counter-UAS capabilities, defend against UAV attacks, those defences are not sufficiently effective to prevent strikes on critical infrastructure that inflict major damage. And the short-range and very short-range air-defences (including AAA systems) and counter-drone potentials of the armed forces of many NATO countries in Europe are considerably lower than those of Gulf states of comparable size. That situation will not change until modernization programmes, often planned over several — if not many — years, are completed. 

At the same time the drone threat can emerge here and now, so urgent steps are required to improve the situation. The commissioned solutions must be economical and ready for mass manufacture, much like the offensive means they are intended to counter. An Estonian firm, Frankenburg Technologies, has attempted to develop such a system. It has not yet entered series production, but as the company’s president, Kusti Salm — a former secretary of state at Estonia’s ministry of defence and ex-head of the country’s defence procurement agency — told Defence24, the system has already received initial orders, is being continuously improved, and work on a complete kit is being finalised. This is one of the new technological areas worth investing in.  

At the same time, it is important not to forget existing solutions. One such system is the Polish Piorun MANPADS, which has been combat-proven in Ukraine. Poland is already the largest producer of this type of system within NATO. Current production capacity is roughly 1,300–1,400 missiles per year. Besides Poland and Ukraine, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova and Belgium are among the engaged customers procuring Piorun.   

The Piorun is registered in the SAFE programme; Poland plans to buy another batch, and purchases from other states (including France, Germany and Lithuania) are possible or under consideration. Piorun has many advantages, not least its cost-effectiveness. It is at least an order of magnitude cheaper than heavier surface-to-air missiles, yet it can effectively engage a range of targets, from drones to cruise missiles.  

The most recent contract for Piorun missiles for the Polish Armed Forces (covering 3,500 rounds and 600 trigger/launch units) was signed in 2022. Although deliveries are ongoing, demand remains high given the Armed Forces« expansion — the formation of new divisions and the Border Defence Component within the Territorial Defence Forces mean needs exceed current output.

Piorun is one of those weapon systems that can relatively quickly saturate units across different services, both existing and newly formed. But bold decisions are required: fresh orders and investment support. While export successes have in part resulted from earlier domestic orders (supplies for Sweden and Belgium were fulfilled within months of order), the Polish Armed Forces still have substantial requirements for Piorun systems. These needs should be addressed urgently, particularly because introducing heavier air-defence systems such as Narew will frequently involve long wait times. It is also desirable that as many targets as possible (for example cruise missiles) are neutralised by cheaper means, like Piorun systems integrated on light vehicles, including unmanned platforms.   

Of course, investment must also continue in a range of other low-cost counter-air solutions, including interceptor drones. None of this changes the fact that expensive, heavy systems that can blunt an initial strike must be complemented by solutions that enable sustained defence. And the role of the latter within the armed forces should be substantially larger than before. Such systems should be produced domestically.  

The prolonged conflict already unfolding in Ukraine — and the situation that appears to be developing in the Persian Gulf — demonstrates the importance of defence economics. If neither side achieves decisive success in the first days or even hours of a conflict, economic efficiency becomes crucial. That requires major changes within western defence industries, which have focused on delivering high-performance but costly and hard-to-manufacture equipment. We should seize the opportunities that already exist in Poland and allied countries to ensure adequate saturation of defence systems in response to the mass-technological war pushed by Russia and its partners.