„Resilient infrastructure and logistics for long-term defense on NATO’s Eastern Flank require stronger EU support”

During a major panel at Defence24 Days, the largest security conference in Central and Eastern Europe, held in Warsaw on 6–7 May, the defence ministers of Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, and Estonia spoke in broadly the same voice, but with different complementary emphases on today’s security priorities. Kosiniak-Kamysz, for his part, highlighted Poland’s ambition to become not only a regional, but a European NATO leader, primarily by building the continent’s strongest and largest land army, including through plans to expand total manpower to 500,000 by 2030.

Robert Kaliňák, his Slovak counterpart, in turn emphasised the need for robust infrastructure and logistics capable of sustaining a long-term war effort on NATO’s Eastern Flank, arguing that such efforts require stronger EU backing. He also stressed that international defence policy must remain free from ideological and partisan considerations in order to be truly effective.

Latvian Defence Minister Andris Sprūds stressed that “speed is extremely important,” both in force responsiveness and industrial adaptation. In his view, Latvia exemplifies “NATO in practice,” with a strong Allied presence through NATO’s Multinational Brigade Latvia, comprising 3,500 troops from 14 nations. The Baltic country also hosts the newly established NATO Innovation Range for uncrewed systems, while co-leading the International Drone Coalition with the UK and hosting the Drone Summit 2026, positioning itself as an emerging European drone hub.

Their Estonian counterpart, Hanno Pevkur, highlighted the need to increase defence readiness, particularly through large, well-trained reserve forces capable of rapid mobilisation. Estonia, in fact, never abandoned mandatory military service for men, while Latvia reintroduced conscription in 2024. Poland and Slovakia, by contrast, do not maintain mandatory conscription systems.

The Estonian minister also warned that national protectionism continues to undermine competition, efficiency, and interoperability across Europe. He placed particular emphasis on whether countries are making the right procurement choices for future battlefields, which is essential for avoiding the risk of preparing for a war that will not be fought, or fighting it on the enemy’s terms. His Latvian counterpart added that Europe must therefore prioritise speed, specialisation, and learning in arms production to keep pace with rapid technological change.

Further expansion and greater support from the South

The discussion made clear that expanding land forces remains an overriding priority. Since 2022, each of these countries has continued to increase the size of its military. Yet even once the three smaller states reach their planned force levels, their combined armies will still be roughly four times smaller than Poland’s projected future force, showcasing massive differences in potential across the region.

Externally, the ministers agreed that one of the key roles of Eastern Flank countries is to keep reminding other Allies, especially those in the South, of the need to raise defence spending and adhere to the newly agreed thresholds.

Different perceptions, different weights

NATO’s north-eastern flank is the Alliance’s most exposed region to Russian threats, in both hybrid and conventional forms. Recent developments have further elevated the geostrategic importance of the Baltic Sea. Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO, combined with intensifying Russian sabotage and hybrid activities, has turned the region into one of the key flashpoints in the broader confrontation between the West and Russia. 

Against this deteriorating security environment, Poland, Estonia, and Latvia either meet or are close to meeting NATO’s new 5% defence spending benchmark, placing them among the Alliance’s leaders in this regard. Slovakia, by contrast, continues to spend around 2% of its GDP on defence, still adhering to the previous threshold.

These differences in defence spending, urgency, and military scale illustrate that varying perceptions of the Russian threat persist even within NATO’s north-eastern flank. They also naturally shape the extent to which individual countries are able to contribute to the region’s security architecture, and, more broadly, the Alliance’s overall defence posture.